Nuclear security and policy

Associate Prof. Areg Danagoulian has developed a satellite equipped with specialized neutron detectors that he hopes will fill the gaps in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons in space without a way to verify satellites are not carrying them. “[I]f the concept proves to be practical enough to someone in charge, it could finally give us a way to verify that there really aren’t any nukes floating precariously over our heads,” writes Luis Prada for Vice. 

Financial Times reporter Michael Peel features CubeSat, a proposed satellite sensor by Associate Prof. Areg Danagoulian, able to identify hidden nuclear weapons in space.  “If one state suspects another of placing a nuclear weapon in orbit, the absence of a verification mechanism makes the crisis harder to manage,” says Danagoulian. “If a bad-faith actor knows that their attempt will be discovered via inspection, they will be more likely to decide it's not worth pursuing.” 

Gizmodo’s Ellyn Lapointe reports on a new paper from Associate Prof. Areg Danagoulian, which offers a  solution to verifying satellites aren’t carrying hidden nuclear weapons in space: an inspector satellite able to indicate the presence of uranium from neutron signals via sensor technology. Danagoulian’s proposal seeks to fill the gaps of The Outer Space Treaty (OST), established in 1967 and signed by 118 countries to ban nuclear weapons in space, which “has always lacked robust means of verification for space-based nuclear threats,” says Danagoulian. 

In a new study, Associate Prof. Areg Danagoulian proposes a satellite-based sensor that could monitor suspicious craft for signs of nuclear activity in space with 99% accuracy, reports Andrew Paul for Popular Science. “You can fake intelligence, but you can’t fake physics,” says Danagoulian. “The goal right now is to get national labs to use this work for their own research, and to get policymakers to seriously consider this technology as a potential part of national technical means.” 

Scientific American’s Adam Kovac highlights a paper by Associate Prof. Areg Danagoulian that proposes a satellite to detect and police hidden nuclear weapons in space by detecting spallation, the ejection of neutrons, from the bombardment of high energy protons, and uranium atoms. “If you detect those neutrons, that itself can be a telltale sign that there is an unusual amount of uranium on the satellite, and it’s most likely to be a nuclear weapon,” Danagoulian says.

A new tabletop exercise, developed by researchers at MIT and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has found that “a further buildup of U.S. nuclear capabilities would have limited effect on whether China might use its own nuclear weapons should a war over Taiwan erupt,” reports Brad Dress and Ellen Mitchell for The Hill. “The first large-scale war game of such an incident,” they write, “found that a U.S. buildup that goes past current modernization plans would not bolster nuclear deterrence in relation to Taiwan.” 

Researchers at MIT and the Center for Strategic and International Studies have used a tabletop exercise to determine whether a further build-up of US nuclear capabilities would impact China’s nuclear weapon use in Taiwan, reports Kathrin Hille for Financial Times. “The US has 600-plus tactical nuclear weapons, and it is modernizing their delivery means,” explains Principal Research Scientist Eric Heginbotham. “In the game, the one US team that employed tactical nuclear weapons used fewer than a dozen. In no cases did any of the participants ever say: ‘We need SLCM-N or some other system that is not in the inventory or being deployed under the current modernization plan.’”

Prof. Vipin Narang speaks with New York Times reporter David E. Sanger about the “use of nuclear weapons as the ultimate bargaining chip.” Narang explains: “A nuclear threshold is not determined by words, but by the deterrence balance and stakes, and changes to declaratory doctrine do not at all change the deterrence balance between the U.S., NATO and Russia.”

Research affiliate Thomas Neff, a physicist known for his proposal aimed at “reducing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons and helping stabilize the former Soviet Union,” has died at age 80, reports Harrison Smith for the Washington Post. Credited with the “Megatons to Megawatts” agreement, “Dr. Neff spent years working in arms control, nuclear weapons proliferation and uranium markets, bridging the divide between experts who specialized in the kind of highly enriched uranium used for warheads and the far less enriched version used for electricity generation,” Smith writes.

Research affiliate Thomas Neff, a physicist whose work with nuclear weapon conversion led to an agreement “that reduced nuclear threats and produced one of the greatest peace dividends of all time,” has died at the age of 80, reports William J. Broad for The New York Times. Neff’s idea of converting Soviet nuclear weapons into electricity used to power American cities “turned some 20,000 Russian nuclear arms into electricity, lighting billions of American lightbulbs.” 

Senior Lecturer John Parsons speaks with CNN reporters Angela Dewan, Ella Nilsen and Lou Robinson about the future of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) – nuclear technology that is smaller and less costly to build than traditional, large-scale reactors. “The target here is to produce electricity cheaper than coal and gas plants,” says Parsons. These fossil fuel plants “are terribly simple and cheap to run – they’re just dirty.”

Graduate student Lt. Col. Jill Rahon, a war veteran and seasoned pilot, discusses her journey from her tours in Afghanistan to her research at MIT on engineering solutions for the enforcement of nuclear nonproliferation accords, writes Sam Cavanaugh for Hoodline. “The path Rahon has blazed is marked by courage and ingenuity, from deftly handling the controls of a Chinook helicopter over the treacherous terrains of Afghanistan to meticulously studying the nuances of resonance analysis to keep nuclear powers in check,” writes Cavanaugh. 

In an article for The Boston Globe, Prof. Emeritus Ernest Moniz explores the risks associated with the cesium-137 devices used in hospitals. “Boston hospitals have an opportunity to receive tens of thousands of dollars of grants toward the purchase of new equipment that is just as effective for medical and research purposes as the radiological devices they have been using for decades,” writes Moniz, “while shedding the liabilities and security costs associated with cesium sources.”

Writing for The New York Times, Steven Simon, a fellow at the MIT Center for International Studies, and Jonathan Stevenson of the International Institute for Strategic Studies explore the Biden administration’s response to Russia’s nuclear threats. “The United States and NATO should be less deferential to Mr. Putin’s attempt to wield the threat of nuclear weapons,” they write, “not only for the sake of supporting Ukraine but also to ensure global geopolitical stability in the future.”

A series of recently tested hypersonic missiles in North Korea brings forth concerns about vulnerability for U.S. troops and their allies in Asia, reports Josh Smith for Reuters. Research affiliate David Wright warns that “South Korea and the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops based there are so close that incoming missiles could fly on even lower trajectories, with a much shorter flight time, making defense more difficult,” writes Smith.